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DUE PROCESS IN ACADEMIC DISMISSALS
FROM POST SECONDARY SCHOOLS
In 1961, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dixon
v. Alabama State Board of Education' held that a student dismissed from a
state college for disciplinary reasons was entitled to minimal notice and
hearing. This was the first time that a court had explicitly adopted the view
that a disciplinary dismissal from a public post secondary school without
these procedural safeguards violated property and liberty rights protected by
the fourteenth amendment. 2  Although in recent years the Supreme Court
has extended due process protection to newly evolving property and liberty
interests, 3 it did not directly address disciplinary dismissals or suspensions of
students from any part of the academic community until 1975 in Goss v.
Lopez.4  In Goss, because a state statute specifically provided that all
students in primary and secondary schools were entitled to a free education,5
the Court held that the plaintiffs, high school students, had a property interest
in that education. Moreover, because of the stigma attached to a suspension or
expulsion from school, and attendant potential damage to future educational
and employment opportunities, a liberty interest was recognized. The Court
ruled that students facing even temporary suspension from public high school
were entitled to notice of the charges, an explanation of any evidence against
them, and an opportunity to present evidence in their favor.0 Although Goss
1. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... "
The doctrine expressed in Dixon was repeatedly upheld by other courts of appeals
in cases involving both the suspension and dismissal of high school and college students.
See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Calloway v. Briggs,
443 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Striclder, 422 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1970);
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
3. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (self-help repossession); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971) (revocation of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termi-
nation of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (gar-
nishment of wages).
4. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
5. This statutory guarantee of an education is not present at the post secondary
level. But see note 39 infra.
6. 419 U.S. at 581. The Court stopped short of requiring the full trial-type protec-
tions of representation by counsel and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses
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dealt with suspensions from a high school, the Court approved for the first
time the Dixon doctrine that a student expelled from a tax-supported post
secondary institution was entitled to due process protection. 7
Notwithstanding the expansion of students' rights in the area of discipli-
nary dismissals, the courts continued to maintain a laissez faire attitude
toward dismissals based solely on a student's poor academic performance. In
the area of academic dismissals it was believed that the evaluation of a
student's work was clearly within the province of the school authorities, and
judicial intervention would be appropriate only when it could be shown that
the school had acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.8 Courts refused
to accept the argument that a post secondary student had an entitlement9 in
his education of sufficient weight to warrant notice and hearing prior to
dismissal for poor academic performance. Likewise, the courts were not
convinced that the stigma attached to an academic dismissal so damaged the
student's reputation or chances for future educational or employment oppor-
tunities that the procedural protections of the fourteenth amendment would
be required.
Two recent cases from the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have re-examined this question. Though their conclusions are noticeably
different, and demonstrate that a good deal of disagreement on this matter
still exists, they reveal that the courts are expanding due process rights in this
area and are examining more closely the circumstances surrounding, and
ultimate results of, academic dismissals from public post secondary schools.
In Gaspar v. Bruton'° a practical nursing student, who had an adequate
grade point average in her classroom work, was dismissed because she
for temporary suspensions, but it did note that the extent of due process protection re-
quired would increase with the severity of the punishment. Id. at 584.
7. Id. at 576 n.8. The Court referred to Dixon as the "landmark" decision in the
area of disciplinary dismissals. Id.
8. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362
F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt.
1965).
9. The concept of property entitlement has been advanced by the Court in its ex-
pansion of due process protection. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 403 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
The Court distinguished an entitlement from a vested property right in Goldberg, noting
that today's modern society has many such entitlements which do not fall within tra-
ditional common law concepts of property. 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. Such entitlements
are created by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
10. 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
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performed poorly in the clinical aspects of her studies. The plaintiff argued
that she had not received adequate procedural safeguards prior to her
dismissal and was therefore deprived of protected property and liberty
rights." The district court determined that there had been no violation of
Gaspar's constitutional rights and that the court would not question the
standards used to determine a student's academic ability.' 2 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit adhered to the established standard that, in the area of
academic dismissals, the decisions of school officials would be considered
conclusive unless the student could show that the officials had acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. The court did rule, however, that, in light of
Goss, the plaintiff had a vested property right in her education and was
entitled to some, albeit minimal, due process protection.'8 Nonetheless, the
notice and hearing procedure that the school had given Gaspar was found to
be more than adequate.' 4
In Greenhill v. Bailey,'5 a medical student dismissed because of academic
deficiencies challenged the procedure used by the state-supported Universi-
ty of Iowa College of Medicine to determine his fitness to practice medicine.
The review procedure employed by the school permitted only a written
appeal by the student after an adverse determination by the administration.
Not only was Greenhill dismissed, but a form letter, which would be
available to any medical school to which he might later apply, indicated that
one reason for his dismissal had been "lack of intellectual ability."' 6 The
form, entitled a "Change of Status Form," was sent to the Liaison Committee
on Medical Education of the American Medical Colleges in Washington,
D.C. The district court held that the school had absolute discretion in this
area and that judicial encroachment into the academic sphere was to be
avoided unless the school's bad faith or ill will could be established by the
11. Gaspar's complaint alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
12. 513 F.2d at 849.
13. Id. at 850. The only due process requirement mandated by the court was that
the student "be made aware prior to termination of his failure or impending failure
to meet [minimum academic] standards." Id. at 851.
14. Despite the due process standard established, the court closely examined the pro-
cedural safeguards that had been afforded Gaspar. She had been provided with coun-
seling on her deficiencies, a hearing before the board of education, a hearing before
the superintendent of the school at which she could confront faculty and staff and
present her case, and finally, after her dismissal, a formal hearing with the opportunity.
to present witnesses and to confront opposing witnesses. Id. at 847. The procedures
employed by the school administration were considered fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. at 850-51.
15. 519 F.2d 5 (8thCir. 1975).
16. Id. at 7.
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student. 17 The Eighth Circuit agreed that state school officials had a wide
area of judgment when evaluating the academic work of their students, but
maintained that the courts could intervene when a public educational institu-
tion "acts to deprive an individual of a significant interest in either liberty or
property."' 8 While academic dismissal alone was not enough to warrant due
process protection, the denigration of the student's intellectual ability in con-
junction with the dismissal resulted in injury to a significant liberty interest
and triggered a notice and hearing requirement. 19 The court ruled that the
actions of the school officials imposed on the student "'a stigma . . . that
foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other [employment] opportuni-
ties.' "120 Recognizing the distinction between academic and disciplinary
dismissals, the court nonetheless maintained that when a significant interest
in liberty or property is affected by the school's actions, due process must
be followed.21
Admittedly these two decisions do not prescribe the same procedural
safeguards for academic dismissals from post secondary schools that Goss
established for disciplinary dismissals from public high schools. They do,
however, represent a limited extension of due process requirements into the
heretofore sacrosanct area of determination of academic deficiency in state-
supported post secondary schools. This note will concern itself with this
extension, how it has evolved from earlier guidelines established by the
courts, and the possibility that the concepts instituted in these cases will be
adopted and further expanded by other courts.
I. DUE PROCESS IN THE POST SECONDARY
ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
The current increase in judicial attention to the methods used by post
secondary schools in academic dismissals can best be understood by examin-
ing the concurrent histories of due process in disciplinary proceedings and
academic dismissals, especially in relation to recent extensions of due process
in other areas.
17. Greenhill v. Bailey, 378 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
18. 519 F.2d at 7.
19. Id. at 8. The Court decided this case solely on the issue of the deprivation
of a liberty interest. It felt that it was unnecessary to determine whether or not Green-
hill had a property interest in continuing his education. Id. n.9.
20. Id., citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). The court also
mentioned that the actions of the school officials might injure the student's reputation
in the community. 519 F.2d at 8 n.8.
21. Id. at 7. The court held that "at the very least" the student should receive no-
tification of any alleged deficiency in intellectual ability and a chance to personally
[Vol. 26: 111
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A. Due Process in Post Secondary School Disciplinary Matters
Prior to Dixon, two judicial theories were consistently advanced to deny
any measure of procedural protection to the post secondary school student
faced with official action. The first was the common law doctrine that
colleges were in loco parentis and could control a student's actions to the
same extent as parents.22 Under this view, a post secondary student had
virtually no rights and was subject to the unquestioned authority of the
school. The second theory reasoned that when a student enrolled in a
college or university, he entered into a contract with the school to abide by
its disciplinary rules and regulations. 23  These regulations were framed in
the broadest possible language to ensure that any deviant conduct could be
handled summarily. 24  In the federal courts these theories served to rein-
force an underlying reluctance to interfere with the states' handling of what
was deemed to be essentially a state function. Federal intervention was.
considered appropriate only when a state-supported institution discriminated
against a student because of race or religion.25
contest such allegations, but it stopped short of mandating the full trial-type protections.
Id. at 9.
22. Blackstone set out this theory as follows:
A parent may also delegate part of his parental authority during his life, to
a tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the child committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and
correction as may be necessary to answer for the purpose for which he is em-
ployed.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453 (4th ed. 1771). The extreme extent to which the
courts felt this control could go is well illustrated by the following passage from Gott
v. Berea College:
mhe school, its officials and students, are a legal entity, as much so as any
family, and, like a father may direct his children, those in charge of boarding
schools are well within their rights and powers when they direct their students
what to eat and where they may get it, where they may go, and what forms
of amusement are forbidden.
156 Ky. 376, 381, 161 S.W. 204, 207 (1913). See also Keller & Meskill, Student Rights
and Due Process, 3 J. LAw & EDuc. 389 (1974).
23. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); An-
thony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Samson v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup. Ct.), af/'d mem., 181 App.
Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1917).
24. One example is an old Syracuse University regulation which all students were
required to sign:
Attendance at the University is a privilege and not a right. In order to safe-
guard [its] scholarship and [its] moral atmosphere, the University reserves the
right to request the withdrawal of any student whose presence is deemed detri-
mental. Specific charges may or may not accompany a request for withdrawal.
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 438 (1928).
25. See, e.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
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The growing discontent with the judicial policy of nonintervention was ex-
pressed well by the late Harvard Professor Warren A. Seavey, who was ap-
palled that educational institutions whose very existence depended on the
preservation of basic freedoms would dismiss a student for disciplinary rea-
sons without any procedural safeguards. He characterized the courts' re-
sponse as "denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket,' 26 and
argued that the professor-student relationship demanded that all facts perti-
nent to a disciplinary dismissal be made known to the student. 27
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education28 was the first significant de-
parture from the practice of judicial nonintervention in disciplinary dismissals
from post secondary schools. -In Dixon, students were dismissed from a state-
supported college as a result of involvement in a civil rights demonstration.
They were neither told of the grounds for their dismissal, nor were they given
a chance to speak on their own behalf.2 9 The court of appeals ruled that
because dismissal from college would deny the student possible future educa-
tional and employment opportunities, he was entitled to due process protec-
tion before expulsion. 0 To determine what procedural protections were re-
quired, the court balanced the right of the student to continue his education
against the importance of the specific state power that had been exercised. 81
26. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1407
(1957).
27. Professor Seavey suggested that this relationship was a fiduciary relationship
wherein the function of the professor was "to act for the benefit of [the student] as
to matters relevant to the relation between them." Id. at 1407 n.3, citing RESTATEMENT
oF AGENCY § 390 (1933), RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 170 (1935). Presumably this
duty of the professor to act in the student's best interests and keep the student informed
of all relevant facts in transactions between them could be recognized in academic as
well as disciplinary dismissals.
28. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
29. The usual school practice allowed for a hearing before a disciplinary expulsion
and a conference with faculty members before dismissal for academic deficiency. The
school authorities argued that since the students had been dismissed for violating state
law, as opposed to university regulations, normal procedure was not applicable. 294
F.2d at 154-55.
30. Id. at 157. This line of reasoning reflects the commonly held view that a college
education is no longer a luxury but a necessity. See Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1969). Professor Wright indicated that because
the value of a post secondary education has increased so much in recent years, a student
should not be summarily dismissed for disciplinary reasons. However, Wright did not
feel that due process protection is applicable in the area of academic dismissals, because
school authorities are the experts in deciding the value of a student's academic work.
See id. at 1032, 1070.
31. 294 F.2d at 156. This balancing concept has been used by the Supreme Court
to extend the degree of due process required in several noneducation cases. See cases
cited note 3 supra. Professor Wright also stressed the importance of this test and main-
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Dixon established minimum procedures required in disciplinary dismissals
from state post secondary schools: the student should be given the names
of the witnesses against him and the facts to which those witnesses testified;
he should have an opportunity to present his own defense, including presenta-
tion of witnesses; and the findings of any hearing should be made available
to him in writing.8 2 The Dixon standards were substantially adhered to by
other circuits in subsequent cases 83  Despite the widespread acceptance of
the right to due process in disciplinary dismissals from state schools, the courts
consistently refused to apply procedural safeguards when the student facing
disciplinary action was from a private school.3
4
The first express recognition by the Supreme Court that students at any
stage of their public education were entitled to due process protection in a
disciplinary dismissal came in Goss v. Lopez.35 Although Goss dealt with
the suspension of a public'high school student, it was the first case in which
the Court sanctioned the Dixon doctrine, and it was relied upon by the
courts of appeals in Gaspar and Greenhill. Under the Goss rationale and
facts, a public school student has both a property and liberty interest in pub-
lic education, and these interests are sufficient to warrant notice and a hear-
ing before even temporary suspensions.36 The Court reasoned that since all
tained that any procedure given to a student should be judged on the basis of its fairness
and reasonableness. See Wright, supra note 30, at 1060, 1070.
32. 294 F.2d at 158-59. The Dixon court did not feel that a full trial-type hearing
was necessary or appropriate. Id. at 159.
33. See note 2 supra.
34. In attempts to gain due process protection for private school students, two argu-
ments have been raised unsuccessfully. Some litigants have claimed unsuccessfully that
even private school dismissals involve state action since the state requires that certain
subjects be taught and gives indirect assistance to private schools. See Bright v. Isen-
barger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970). See also Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609
(D.D.C. 1967). Secondly, it has been suggested that when a student is admitted to a
university, he enters into a contract with the school to obey the school's regulations. If
the student breaks those rules, he has rescinded his contract; but because the burden of
proving rescission is on the university, some form of hearing would be required. See
Comment, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAIv. L. REV. 1045,
1145-47 (1968).
35. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In the academic realm, the Court previously had addressed
the due process rights of teachers who had been dismissed. See, e.g., Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Court had dealt with the dismissal
or suspension of students only in the context of first amendment violations. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. The two-step analysis used by the Court asked first whether a sufficient interest
existed to warrant fourteenth amendment protection, and second, how much proce-
dural protection was required. 419 U.S. at 576-77.
1976]
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students in Ohio were extended the statutory right to an education,"7 they
had a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to an education and could demand
procedural protection of that property interest.88 In post secondary schools,
however, this statutorily created entitlement is generally not present. Al-
though the Gaspar court believed that post secondary students had a property
interest, the Greenhill court noted the difference in the entitlement claim be-
tween post secondary students and those at the elementary and high school
level.8 9
In addition to acknowledging a student's property interest, the Court in
Goss hbld that sustained and recorded charges of misconduct could have an
adverse effect on the student's future educational and employment opportuni-
ties.40 Contrasting the suspension or expulsion of a student with the decision
not to rehire a university teacher after the expiration of a one-year contract,
the Court considered the injury in the latter case to be speculative and insub-
stantial4 ' whereas harm to the expelled or suspended student was adjudged
to be virtually inevitable. 42  Since the student's "good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity" were at stake, the Court ruled that due process was re-
quired to protect him against a deprivation of liberty. 43 This aspect of the
37. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.64 (1972) established that all children between
the ages of 6 and 21 were entitled to free primary and secondary education.
38. 419 U.S. at 573-74.
39. See 513 F.2d at 850; 519 F.2d at 8 n.9. There is one instance where it conceiv-
ably could be argued that there is a statutory right to post secondary education. The
California legislature has mandated that "all qualified California youth be insured the
opportunity to pursue higher learning." CAL. EDUc. CODE § 22520 (West 1975). How-
ever,
[O]nce enrolled he should have the opportunity to continue as long and as
far as his capacity and motivation, as indicated by his academic performance
and commitment to educational advancement, will lead him to meet academic
standards and institution requirements.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22521 (West 1975). Therefore, while there is a statutory right
in California to a higher education, that right is conditioned on the student's meeting
"academic standards." If the student fails to meet these standards, a judgment that
has always been left for the school's determination, the statute offers him no protection.
40. 419 U.S. at 575.
41. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
42. 419 U.S. at 575-76. Roth did establish that if a person's future employability
were affected by state action there was a cognizable liberty interest; but the Court held
that the mere fact that refusal to hire would make the teacher less attractive to other
potential employers was not sufficient reason to recognize a liberty right. See 408 U.S.
at 574 n.13. In Goss, the appellees contended that colleges and employers frequently
were interested in whether an applicant had been dismissed or suspended from school.
The Court noted, therefore, that future educational and employment opportunities would
certainly be limited. 419 U.S. at 575 n.7.
43. 419 U.S. at 574, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
In Constantineau, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to due process protection before
[Vol. 26: 111
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Court's decision, however, must be read in light of recent case law44 holding
that an interest in "reputation" alone is not sufficient to warrant due process
protection, but rather there must be a deprivation of a previously recognized
right.4
5
B. Due Process In Post Secondary Academic Dismissals
Despite the extension of due process into the area of disciplinary dismiss-
als, the courts continued to maintain that determination of academic ability
is a matter in which only the schools possess the required expertise. As long
as the school authorities used good faith and were not arbitrary in formulating
and applying academic standards, the courts refused to grant students any
procedural protection.46  This had been particularly true in post secondary
her name was "posted" in all retail liquor stores as a threat to the public peace because
of her drinking, and the sale of liquor to her was forbidden for one year.
44. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
45. This previously recognized right may come from the Constitution, state law, or
existing rules or understandings. See 424 U.S. at 707-12. In Davis, the plaintiff's
photograph was included in a flyer that listed active shoplifters and was sent to several
Louisville, Kentucky stores, even though he had never actually been convicted of shop-
lifting. Since he did not lose his job as a result of the flyer, but was merely repri-
manded by his employer, the Court held that no procedural protections were required.
The Court distinguished Constantineau by saying that Mrs. Constantineau had been de-
prived of a right held under state law-"the right to purchase or obtain liquor in com-
mon with the rest of the citizenry,"-but that no such right existed in Davis' case. Id.
at 708.
In Bishop, the Court further reduced the viability of Constantineau. Bishop, a police
officer, was dismissed for "failure to follow certain orders, . . . causing low morale,
and conduct unsuited to an officer." 96 S. Ct. at 2077. These reasons were made
known to the officer privately at the time of his dismissal and were stated in writing
in answer to interrogatories during pretrial discovery after the officer filed suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Court ruled that in the former instance, there was
no damage to "good name, reputation, honesty, or integrity" since the communication
was made in private, and that since the latter statement was made after the officer
initiated legal action, it could not "provide retroactive support for his claim." 96 S.
Ct. at 2079-80. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that Davis and Bishop "effectively
destroy even the last vestige of protection for 'liberty' ...." Id. at 2081 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Connelly v. Uni-
versity of Vt. & State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). One of
the earlier expressions of this doctrine was in Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216
Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913), in which a student was dismissed from a public school
because his standing in the class was not high enough. In Barnard, however, the stu-
dent was not denied the opportunity to receive an education. "Public" schools in Mas-
sachusetts at this time were regional schools with high admission and retention stand-
ards. When a student was dismissed from a public school, he could still attend one
of the local town schools. The court stressed that academic dismissals were a matter
solely within the school board's discretion, but they also relied heavily on the fact that
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
schools where freedom from outside interference in the operation of the
school was considered essential if the school were to operate effectively as a
"marketplace of ideas."'47  Two questions were traditionally asked by the
courts in determining whether judicial intervention was warranted: had the
student met the school's minimum academic requirements, and were school
authorities motivated by ill will or bad faith in dismissing him? The first
question was always within the school's discretion, and only if that discretion
was found to have been abused would the courts intervene. 48  Case law es-
tablished that for a student to have any redress in the courts, he must show
that the actions of the school were "arbitrary or capricious. ' 49  When the
school's determination amounted to an honest evaluation of a post secondary
student's academic work, and his dismissal was the result of this determina-
tion, the student was held not to have a property or liberty interest that war-
ranted due process protection. 0
the student still was afforded the opportunity to attend another school. Id. at 22, 102
N.E. at 1097.
Under the Goss doctrine, when an education is statutorily guaranteed it is arguable
that a public high school student could not be academically dismissed without notice
and hearing since the result would be the foreclosure of that guaranteed education.
47. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
48. See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp.
156 (D. Vt. 1965), in which the district court held that, because a teacher had told
a student that he would not pass regardless of the quality of his work, the student's
dismissal was not based on the quality of his work. The court did not hold that the
student should have received a passing grade in the course, but, because of the alleged
bad faith on the part of the professor, the student had a cause of action. Id. at 161.
49. See, e.g., Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973), discussed at
p. 121 infra; Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (assignment of grades
to a law student held to be a matter of the professor's discretion and only when the
professor's actions were arbitrary or capricious would the federal courts intervene);
Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932) (medical student who failed
three major subjects and was automatically dismissed was held not to be entitled to
any due process protection unless he could show arbitrary action on the school's part),
50. It would appear that a student is not entitled to procedural safeguards if failing
grades are erroneously calculated by an incompetent professor. Assignment of grades
is left strictly to the professor and unless the student can show arbitrariness, as was
the case in Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp.
156 (D. Vt. 1965), he will not be entitled to any procedural safeguards. The courts
have consistently declined to determine when a student's work is substandard. While
courts obviously cannot determine the value of academic work, it has been sug-
gested that when a student claims that a careless professor did not properly assess his
performance, the court might require that the failing student's work be reevaluated by
another faculty member. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1139 (1968). A recent Supreme Court case, however,
implied that the Court would not be especially receptive to this suggestion. In Bishop
v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), a case involving the dismissal of a police officer for
allegedly false reasons, the court stated:
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While the arbitrary and capricious standard has been retained, recent de-
cisions have looked more closely at the circumstances surrounding academic
dismissals. Courts have continued to refuse to evaluate a student's work, but
in some cases they have been more reluctant to accept automatically a
school's contention that a dismissal was in fact an academic dismissal. In
Brookins v. Bonnell,51 for example, a nursing student, allegedly dismissed for
academic failure, claimed that he had been arbitrarily dismissed for actions
that were unrelated to his academic performance. 52  The court agreed that
the dismissal was in fact for disciplinary rather than academic reasons and
held that due process protection similar to that set out in Dixon was re-
quired.5 3
Thus, until recently, the courts have only been willing to examine academic
dismissals from public post secondary schools to determine if they were arbi-
trary or capricious, or if they were for disciplinary rather than academic
reasons. Where the dismissal was based strictly on academic perform-
ance, the courts have not been willing to recognize a property or liberty inter-
est held by the student sufficient in and of itself to invoke due process.
II. EXPANSION OF DUE PROCESS IN POST SECONDARY
SCHOOL ACADEMIC DISMISSALS
Both Gaspar v. Bruton5 4 and Greenhill v. Bailey55 reaffirmed the doctrine
that courts will not examine the evaluation of academic performance in state-
supported post secondary schools unless the schools' actions are arbitrary or
capricious. These two cases, however, have expanded the role of due process
in academic dismissals in two significant ways. Gaspar recognized that a stu-
dent who pays an enrollment fee is vested with a property right protected
by due process.5 6 Greenhill held that once school authorities go beyond a
mere evaluation of a student's academic performance, to a characterization
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multi-
tude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. We must
accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the
day-to-day administration of our affairs.
Id. at 2080.
51. 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
52. Id. at 383. The court expanded the meaning of a disciplinary dismissal by ruling
that the student's actions were not misconduct that would subject him to disciplinary
proceedings but rather were misconduct in the sense that he had failed to do something
required of all students. Id.
53. Id.
54. 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
55. 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
56. 513 F.2d at 850.
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of his personal traits, and make that characterization public, the student is
deprived of a significant liberty interest if he is not accorded some notice and
hearing.57
A. Property Interest in Academic Dismissals
In reaching its decision in Gaspar, the court of appeals emphasized that
the controversy did not involve a disciplinary matter, but was rather a ques-
tion of Gaspar's total academic performance. Notwithstanding the fact that
the dismissal was an academic one, the court reasoned that if, under Goss,
a public high school student had a property right in his education, then Gas-
par, who had paid an enrollment fee to attend school, had a vested property
right a fortiori.5 8 From the language of the court's opinion, it is unclear
whether the student acquired her property interest merely by enrolling in the
state-supported school or by paying her enrollment fee and thereby creating a
contract between herself and the school.5 9 If the Tenth Circuit has ruled that
the student had a property interest merely because she enrolled in a state
school, the opinion does not stand on solid ground. As the Eighth Circuit
noted in Greenhill,6" the high school student in Goss, who was guaranteed
an education by statutory provision, had a significantly different claim of en-
titlement to his education than that of the post secondary student who is ad-
mitted to college or graduate school on a competitive basis. While the enti-
tlement in Goss arose from existing rules or understandings, without the
57. 519 F.2d at 8.
58. 513 F.2d at 850. The court of appeals spoke of a "vested property right" rather
than of a property "interest" or "legitimate claim of entitlement." The Supreme Court
has eradicated the use of the old right-privilege distinction to determine if due process
protections apply. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). An
entitlement, as used by the Court, is something less than a constitutional right, yet still
warrants procedural safeguards. See note 9 supra. In Goss, the Court spoke of just
such a protected interest "not created by the Constitution." Rather, they are created,
and their dimensions are defined, "by an independent source such as state statutes or
rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits." 419 U.S. at 572-73, citing Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, supra, at 577. Clearly Gaspar's property interest would constitute such
an entitlement; however, the Tenth Circuit either blurred this distinction or felt that
it was not worth making because entitlements are now granted due process protection
once reserved only for rights.
59. See 513 F.2d at 850. The court asserted:
We have no difficulty in concluding that in light of Goss . . . where the Su-
preme Court recognized a property right in public school students that certainly
such a right must be recognized to have vested with Gaspar, and the more
prominently so in that she paid a specific, separate fee for enrollment and
attendance at Gordon School.
Id.
60. 519 F.2d at 8 n.9. Although the court did not decide the issue of whether a
property interest existed, it seemed inclined to conclude that one did not. Id.
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existence of a contract, there is no such rule or understanding that the public
post secondary school student is entitled to complete his education.
It can be argued, however, that a graduate student has a greater property
interest in his education than a public school student. Theoretically, the
more advanced a student is in his studies, the more he can justifiably rely
on completing his work and attaining a degree. This expectation of graduat-
ing could be considered a property interest, particularly in an era when a
post secondary degree is a prerequisite for many occupations. 61 The major
flaw with this argument, however, is that although a student may have a
much greater personal interest in obtaining a post secondary degree, it is
merely a unilateral expectation. The Supreme Court, in other contexts, has
held that a unilateral expectancy, no matter how great, is not protected by
procedural due process.62 It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile a rec-
ognition of a property interest based on enrollment in a state post secondary
school with those cases.
The only acceptable interpretation of Gaspar then is that the court looked
to the contract between the student and the school as creating a property in-
terest. This would be the first time that a court used a contract theory to
find that a student at a state-supported post secondary school had a property
interest in his education, although the Supreme Court has ruled that a prop-
erty interest in public employment can be created by contract. 63  Using the
contract analogy, when the student accepts the school's offer of admission he
61. Cf. Comment, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. Rv.
1045, 1152-53 (1968). This article contends that the expectation of graduating from
a post secondary school has tended to receive more protection than the expectation of
graduating from other schools. While this article pertains to procedural due process
rights in disciplinary dismissals, dismissal from post secondary schools for academic rea-
sons results in the same significant foreclosure of future educational and employment
opportunities.
The amount of potential loss to a student dismissed from a post secondary school
for academic failure was recognized in Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agricultural
College, 244 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. Vt. 1965), in which the district court held that
"[t]he value of the right of a third year medical student to complete his fourth year
and attain a degree which entitles him to practice the profession of medicine is worth
...in excess of $10,000."
62. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
63. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), in which the existing policies and
practices of the institution were held to have created an implied contract between a
teacher and a state school system. Perry involved the dismissal of a nontenured college
teacher who had been employed by the Texas State College system for 10 years. There
was no formal tenure system, but because of the guidelines used by the school system,
the Court recognized an entitlement that required notice and hearing before dismissal.
This doctrine was recently reaffirmed in Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
The Court, relying on Perry and existing state law, held that "an enforceable expectation:
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enters into a contract with the school. Whether that contract is created
merely by the student enrolling 4 or by his paying an enrollment fee, it enti-
ties the student to receive his education. It is unclear whether the student
is then entitled to complete his education or whether his continued enrollment
is conditioned on satisfactory academic performance. In either case some
due process protection is required to determine if the student has failed to
meet the established standards.6 5
B. Liberty Interest in Academic Dismissals
In determining that the medical student in Greenhill had a legitimate lib-
erty claim, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the standards established by
the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth66 and Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau.67 In Greenhill, both parties agreed that because of information con-
tained in the "Change of Status Form" and its availability to all medical
schools, it would be virtually impossible for the student to be readmitted to
another medical school.68 Because the university, in dismissing Greenhill,
of continued public employment . . . can exist. . . by statute or contract .... " Id.
at 2078.
64. The student in Greenhill maintained that merely by being accepted to medical
school, he acquired a property right in his education. 519 F.2d at 8 n.9.
65. If the terms of the contract are that the student is entitled to complete his educa-
tion, then the due process procedures necessary would approach the requirements of Goss.
If, on the other hand, the student's right to complete his education is conditioned on
satisfactory academic performance, because of the traditional "hands off" policy of the
courts in academic matters, it would appear that less procedural protection would be
required.
While the majority in Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), relied heavily on the
state's interpretation of the contractual relationship, id. at 2078, Justice Brennan, in dis-
sent, suggested that the "existing rules or understandings" must also be examined from
the viewpoint of the state employee and
[alt a minimum, this would require ...an analysis of the common practices
utilized and the expectations generated by the [local government], and the
manner in which the local ordinance would reasonably be read by ...em-
ployees.
Id. at 2082 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Following Justice Brennan's argument, any discussion of what procedural safeguards
should be afforded in a post secondary academic dismissal should include an examination
of the "expectations" generated by the school and the way the student views his relation-
ship with the school. This argument appears to be in direct conflict with the doctrine
expressed in Roth that unilateral expectations, no matter how great, do not create a
property interest. 408 U.S. at 577.
66. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See notes 41-42 & accompanying text supra.
67. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). See note 43 supra.
68. 519 F.2d at 8. School authorities argued, however, that Greenhill's poor grades
alone would preclude him from gaining admission to another medical school. Id. at
8 n.6.
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criticized not only his academic performance, but also his "intellectual abil-
ity," the resulting stigma significantly reduced his opportunities for future em-
ployment.69 The thrust of the court's decision was that the school did more
than just evaluate academic performance. In "denigrating" the student's in-
tellect, it overstepped the bounds of an academic evaluation and, as a result,
due process protection became necessary. 70 In all likelihood, if the school
authorities had not communicated this evaluation of the student's intellectual
ability outside the school, or if the "Change of Status Form" reflected only
that Greenhill had not met required academic standards, the court would not
have ruled that due process was required. 71
While Greenhill may appear similar to cases in which the courts have inter-
vened in post secondary academic dismissals because the school's actions
were arbitrary or capricious, or because what had been termed an academic
dismissal was actually a disciplinary procedure, there are two significant dif-
ferences. In Greenhill, the record clearly indicated that the plaintiff was a
poor student;72 and there was no evidence that the school's decision to dismiss
him could be considered arbitrary or capricious. Secondly, the court empha-
sized that the dismissal was in no sense a disciplinary one, and that its holding
involved a recognition of the role of due process in explicitly nondisciplinary
areas. 73 In effect, the court held that while public post secondary school au-
thorities can dismiss a student for poor academic performance, they may not
do more than evaluate classroom work, nor may they publicly "denigrate"
a student's personal traits without according him due process protection. 74
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. See also Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153 (8th
Cir. 1973), in which a nontenured faculty member claimed that he had not been reap-
pointed because of his racist statements. Following Roth, the court of appeals held
that while the reappointment refusal alone did not result in deprivation of a liberty
interest, when coupled with the placement of the racist statements in the teacher's per-
manent file, it did constitute a deprivation severe enough to warrant notice and hearing.
71. See 519 F.2d at 8.
72. See id. at 6-7.
73. Id. at 8-9. The court did not characterize its decision as an extension of due
process, but rather observed that "the particular circumstances [met] the criteria articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth . . . and Perry v. Sinderman
. Id. For discussions of these cases, see notes 42 and 63 supra.
Since the Eighth Circuit's decision in Greenhill, the Supreme Court, in Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976), greatly restricted the application of procedural safeguards to
liberty interests. See note 45 supra. Although under the Davis rationale, damage to
reputation alone will not warrant due process protection, Greenhill probably stands unaf-
fected. The Eighth Circuit's primary emphasis in Greenhill was on the foreclosure of
future educational and employment opportunities, rather than on harm to the student's
reputation. 519 F.2d at 8.
74. The emphasis of the court on the public disclosure of the denigration of the
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Having recognized a liberty interest, the court of appeals in Greenhill then
defined the procedural safeguards necessary to protect that interest. In set-
ting out these requirements, the court was influenced by the fact that school
officials were acting in their roles as educators, not as fact-finders as they
would be in a disciplinary matter. Therefore, the safeguards required were
not as extensive as the court had mandated in Dixon.75 All that was neces-
sary in Greenhill was first, that the student be given notice of any reasons
for the dismissal which went beyond academic performance, if such informa-
tion would be available to other schools and would stigmatize his future as
a student; second, that the student be allowed the opportunity to contest
the truth of such information. 76 The required hearing could be an "informal
give-and-take" session rather than a trial-type proceeding. 7" This would pro-
vide the student a chance to clear his name, but still maintain the flexible
environment, unencumbered by rigid judicial procedure, that is essential to
the proper functioning of a post secondary institution.
11. CONCLUSION
The Greenhill and Gaspar decisions will probably not significantly alter
academic dismissal proceedings as they currently exist in state-supported post
secondary schools. Gaspar did hold that students in public post secondary
schools have a property right in their education; nonetheless, when a school
evaluates only the student's total academic performance and its decision re-
student's intellectual ability enables Greenhill to meet the more restrictive standards of
the recent Supreme Court case of Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). In Bishop, a
dismissed police officer was not entitled to due process protection because his superiors
had not made public the reasons for his dismissal. Relying on Bishop, it would appear
that school authorities could consider a student's personal traits in dismissing him and,
so long as those reasons were not made public, no procedural protections would be
required.
An interesting parallel to this approach is found in the treatment of academic dis-
missals in the English courts. In R. v. Senate of the Univ. of Aston, [1969] 2 All
E.R. 964, the court ruled that if a student's traits are even taken into consideration
in evaluating his performance, a hearing is required. Lord Donaldson maintained that
because the university had gone well beyond the student's grades and examined a wide
range of extraneous factors, including the student's personal and family affairs, the stu-
dent should be given an opportunity to present his case. The court contended that
with such an important matter at stake, consideration should be given to more than
just grades, and that common fairness dictated some form of hearing. This approach
not only protects the student, but also gives the university a solid basis for its decision.
Id. at 975-76.
75. 519 F.2d at 9 n.11.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. This informal setting would be conducive to the free flow of information
between students and faculty, a goal implicit in the professor-student fiduciary relation-
ship theory advanced by Professor Seavey. See note 27 supra.
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flects only upon that performance, nothing more than the minimal standards
of notice mandated by Gaspar will be required. When the dismissal reflects
adversely upon more than a student's academic work, the resulting loss of
liberty may, under Greenhill, require the protection of notice and hearing.
While it could be argued that an academic dismissal from some post second-
ary schools, particularly law and medical schools, automatically imposes such
a severe stigma on a student that future employment opportunities are fore-
closed, no court has yet accepted this argument. 78 It would appear that the
argument would fail to establish a property interest because there is no le-
gitimate claim of entitlement, but rather a mere unilateral expectation on the
part of the student. However, because academic dismissal from a profes-
sional school may completely foreclose any chance for employment in that
profession, it is conceivable that the existence of a liberty interest could be
established in that instance.
Although the immediate practical effect of these two cases is uncertain,
they represent an expansion of due process rights into the realm of academic
dismissals. Professor Wright has maintained that the changes in due process
in our colleges and universities have been effected largely because of the in-
creased importance of post secondary education in today's society.79 While
the post secondary academic community and the teacher-student relationship
function optimally when free from outside interference, the courts should en-
sure that there are adequate procedural safeguards to protect the important
interests of post secondary school students, particularly when school authori-
ties venture beyond the narrow evaluation of academic performance.
78. While no court has held that a hearing is required prior to an academic dismissal,
10 U.S.C. § 6963 (1970) provides midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy
with an opportunity to present their cases in a rather unique procedure. The statute
requires that a midshipman who fails any examination will be discharged, unless an
Academic Board recommends otherwise. This Academic Board, in effect, acts on be-
half of the midshipman in a relationship similar to that proposed by Professor Seavey.
See note 27 supra. After a hearing before this Board, where full consideration is given
not only to the midshipman's academic work, but also to personal characteristics, the
Board can recommend that the midshipman be retained. The concept of providing a
hearing that looks at more than just academic performance is compatible with the Eng-
lish law expressed in R. v. Senate of the Univ. of Aston, [1969] 2 All E.R. 964.
79. See Wright, supra note 30, at 1032.
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ADDENDUM
Subsequent to its decision in Greenhill, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has ruled in Horowitz v. Board of Curators0 that because academic
dismissal from a state medical school effectively foreclosed the student's
chances for employment in the field of medicine, a student has a liberty in-
terest in completing her education that warrants due process protection.8'
This decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court.82 Unlike Greenhill,
where information denigrating the student's intellectual ability had been
disseminated, Horowitz involves a purely academic dismissal and the rea-
sons for the dismissal were not made public.
This aspect of the opinion is a dramatic expansion of Greenhill, and in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bishop v. Wood,83 it is
questionable that the decision will be affirmed if heard by the Court. In-
deed, the general interpretation of Greenhill has been that absent public
disclosure of the reasons for dismissal, the student is not stigmatized "in a
constitutional sense.84
While the effect of Greenhill on academic dismissals has been character-
ized in this article as relatively insignificant, it is clear that Horowitz, if
affirmed by the Court, will have a potentially significant impact on "every
graduate and professional school in the nation."8 5
Thomas 1. Bender, Jr.
80. 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir.), reh. denied, 542 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1976) (No. 76-695).
81. 538 F.2d at 1321.
82. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1976) (No.
76-695).
83. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). See notes 45 & 74 supra.
84. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 542 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir.), denying rehearing of
538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976). This factual distinction between Greenhill and Horo-
witz was noted by three judges who felt that the school's petition for rehearing should
have been granted. See also Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1976);
Navato v. Sletten, 415 F. Supp. 312, 317-18 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
Horowitz is distinguishable from Bishop, however, in that the student was almost
absolutely foreclosed from future employment in the field of medicine. See 538 F.2d
at 1320 n.3.
85. Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
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